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I.

INTRODUCTION

The problems associated with inadvertent disclosure are often thought to be
unique to litigators. The American Bar Association and most states seem to
subscribe to that view. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) and equivalent
rules in a majority of states provide that, if a confidential document is inadvertently
disclosed, the receiving lawyer is only obligated to notify the lawyer who made the
mistake. 1 The Rule’s comment provides that whether the receiving lawyer must
return the document or take other steps, “is a matter of law beyond the scope of
these Rules.”2 In other words, if the disclosing lawyer wants the document returned,
the lawyer should go to court and seek a ruling on the legal issue. A transactional
lawyer is unlikely to do this, of course, because there is no pending litigation and thus
no court from which to seek a ruling.
The bottom line is that, in most jurisdictions, professional conduct rules
provide no real protection to transactional lawyers who inadvertently disclose
confidential information. Why not? Perhaps rule makers believe that you can’t
“unring the bell,” 3 so a rule requiring the inadvertently disclosed document’s return

* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010) (providing that an attorney who receives a
document that the lawyer “knows or reasonably should know . . . was inadvertently sent shall
promptly notify the sender”); see infra note 16 and accompanying text for states that have adopted this
rule.
2

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010).

3 See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett & Jeremy Cloud, Coping With Metadata: Ten Key Steps, 61 MERCER L. REV.
471, 476 & n.28 (2010) (giving examples of circumstances in which a producing lawyer cannot “unring
the bell,” such as a transactional lawyer’s inadvertent disclosure of negotiation strategy in document
metadata); Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal & Hon. James C. Francis IV, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views
from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 31 (2007) (explaining that you cannot “un-ring the bell” of
inadvertent disclosure); see also F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (“Once persons
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would be of little value. They may think such relief is only needed in litigation to
prevent the document being admitted as evidence, and a court can provide that relief
by ruling on the issue of privilege waiver. Transactional lawyers, rule makers may
believe, have no need for such a remedy because they do not care about admissibility
at trial. Further, rule makers may be reticent to impose obligations (beyond notice)
on innocent recipients of inadvertent disclosures, opting instead to make the careless,
sending lawyer bear the consequences of the mistake.4
In this article, I refute these misconceptions that are currently embodied in
the professional conduct rules of most jurisdictions. I explain that transactional
lawyers need an inadvertent disclosure solution, even if it is one they create
themselves on an ad hoc basis. In Part II, I describe how transactional lawyers are
susceptible to inadvertent disclosure. Even if privilege waiver does not seem
pressing and irrespective of fault or the ability to “unring the bell,” transactional
lawyers and their clients can be damaged by inadvertent disclosure. That damage
could be lessened by professional conduct rules, but, in a vast majority of
jurisdictions, it is not.
In Part III, I explain how substantially similar inadvertent disclosure
problems faced by transactional lawyers have been addressed for litigators. While
the solutions have not been perfect, litigators have been given tools to protect their
clients from the adverse consequences of inadvertent disclosure. Transactional
lawyers and their clients could benefit from these protections and learn from the
mistakes of their litigator counterparts.
Next, in Part IV, I discuss how transactional lawyers can obtain the
inadvertent disclosure protections that they have been denied by rule makers in most
states. First, I discuss how a lawyer can skillfully react to inadvertent disclosure,
making the best legal and ethical arguments for the document’s return and other
relief. Second, I consider the proactive approach of contracting for protection
against the adverse consequences of inadvertent disclosure. This contractual
not within the ambit of the confidential relationship have knowledge of the communication, that
knowledge cannot be undone. One cannot ‘unring’ a bell.”).
4

See, e.g., Kathleen Maher, Don’t Fax, Don’t Tell: Differing Opinions about ABA Opinions 92-368 and 94382, 12 PROF. LAW. 23, 26 (2001) (explaining that the bar, bench, and commentators criticized a nowwithdrawn ABA ethics opinion that obligated receiving counsel to return an inadvertent disclosure as
inappropriately “placing the burden on the receiving lawyer to protect the confidentiality of a careless
lawyer and his or her client”).
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approach borrows the best and abandons the worst aspects of litigation’s attempted
inadvertent disclosure solutions. Finally, in Part V, I briefly conclude with thoughts
on the future of inadvertent disclosure and transactional lawyers.
II.

TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT
CONFIDENCES

Absent permission from the client, all lawyers are obligated to keep
information learned in the representation of a client confidential.5 Technology has
made it increasingly difficult for lawyers to fulfill this obligation. Both the amount of
information and the ease of its communication can lead to more inadvertent
disclosures than in the day of typewriters and mimeograph machines.6 While some
inadvertent disclosures7 are the result of a lack of care (or even gross negligence or
5

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010) (explaining that a lawyer “shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client” absent client informed consent, an implied
authorization by necessity to carry out the representation, or an exception as defined in the rule); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2010) (stating that a lawyer must safeguard
information competently from inadvertent disclosure); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
cmt. 17 (2010) (“When transmitting [confidential information], the lawyer must take reasonable
precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.”).
6

See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional Conduct
Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 199-203 (2010) (describing the increasing volume of electronically stored
information and ease of inadvertent disclosure by lawyers); see also Bill Piatt & Paula deWitte, Loose
Lips Sink Attorney-Client Ships: Unintended Technological Disclosure of Confidential Communications, 39 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 781, 789-91 (2008) (describing ease of maintaining client confidences before computers
and modern challenges of protecting confidential information).
7

In this article, I use the phrase “inadvertent disclosure” in its broadest sense to describe all
disclosures that were not made intentionally. This definition does not turn on the care (or lack of
care) taken by the disclosing lawyer. It is of note that courts define the term differently – some define
it broadly and others narrowly. See Sidney I. v. Focused Retail Prop. I, LLC, 274 F.R.D. 212, 216
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting the two different approaches courts have taken to interpret the term
“inadvertent” after the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) – one interpretation asks simply
if the disclosure was intentional while the other balances factors to determine if a disclosure is
“inadvertent”); see also Paul W. Grimm et al., Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Has It Lived Up to Its Potential?,
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, *36-41 (2011) (describing two interpretations of “inadvertent” under Rule
502(b)). This definition issue existed before the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) –
some courts used the multi-factor test to determine “inadvertence” which did not result in waiver,
while other courts treated all unintentional disclosures as “inadvertent” and used a multi-factor test to
determine waiver. See Minatronics Corp. v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., No. GD92-7496, 1995 WL
520686, at *6-9 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Allegheny Cnty. Feb. 14, 1995) (discussing the two
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recklessness), many inadvertent disclosures occur despite the lawyer’s reasonable
efforts.8 There is a growing consensus that, given the technology today, even careful
lawyers cannot eliminate the possibility of inadvertent disclosure.9
While inadvertent disclosure in discovery has received a great deal of
attention, inadvertent disclosure happens outside of litigation, too. With a few
mistaken keystrokes, an attorney can send a communication to opposing counsel that
was intended for the client. 10 In exchanging a large number of documents with
opposing counsel, such as in due diligence, a lawyer might unintentionally disclose
confidential attorney-client communications.11 Confidential information can also be
disclosed in the embedded electronic information (commonly referred to as

approaches courts have taken to define inadvertence). The definition becomes important when
attorneys are asked to decide if an opponent’s disclosure was “inadvertent.”
8

See, e.g., Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 445 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (describing the “reasonable” steps taken to remove privileged documents from the document
production, although the process failed and resulted in inadvertent disclosure).

9

See Andrew M. Perlman, The Legal Ethics of Metadata Mining, 43 AKRON L. REV. 785, 793 n.31 (2011)
(“The large increase in commentary, case law, and ethics opinions regarding inadvertent disclosure
since the advent of fax machines offers ample evidence of how technology increases the frequency of
inadvertent disclosures.”). The American Bar Association’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 is currently
considering revising the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to address technology’s impact on
client confidentiality. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Initial Draft Proposals – Technology and
Confidentiality (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/20110502_technology.authcheckdam.pdf.
10

See, e.g., Peter J. Gallagher, Reader Beware: The Evolving Ethics of Reviewing E-Mails Between Employees and
Counsel, 203 N.J. L.J. 1 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.pbnlaw.com/data/articles/
Gallagher%20NJLJ%20Article%203.7.11.pdf (describing background of case Terraphase Engineering,
Inc. v. Arcadis, U.S., Inc., in which an e-mail intended for a client was mistakenly sent to an opposing
party because of an e-mail “autofill” feature and then reviewed by in-house counsel); see also James M.
Fischer, Ethically Handling the Receipt of Possibly Privileged Information, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 200, 222 n.81 (2011) (describing how clicking “reply” rather than “forward”
resulted in communication to unintended recipient).
11

Transactional lawyers might also intentionally disclose confidential client information in due
diligence, but the issues there are different than the issues of inadvertent disclosure. See generally Anne
King, Comment, The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures During Negotiations for Substantial Transactions,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1411–13 (2007) (discussing the law governing whether intentional disclosure
of privileged information during negotiation of business transactions results in a waiver).
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“metadata”) 12 contained in electronic documents exchanged between lawyers, such
as draft contracts in a negotiation.13
Even though the receiving attorney may be legally obligated to return and not
use an opponent’s inadvertently disclosed information,14 a vast majority of states do
not impose these duties under professional conduct rules. Nine states appear to
have no professional conduct rule addressing the issue. 15 Thirty-two states have

12

Metadata is “data about data,” such as the date a document was created or edited. User-created
comments, tracked changes, and the like are embedded electronic information but are not technically
“metadata.” See David Hricik, I Can Tell When You’re Telling Lies: Ethics and Embedded Confidential
Information, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 79, 81 (2006); see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 33 (2d ed. 2007) (defining metadata as
describing “how, when and by whom [electronically stored information] was collected, created,
accessed, modified and how it is formatted”). It is common to refer to all forms of embedded
electronic data as metadata. See, e.g., Hans P. Sinha, The Ethics of Metadata: A Critical Analysis and a
Practical Solution, 63 ME. L. REV. 175, 176 (2010) (describing metadata as coming in two forms: (1)
non-visible data created by a computer program (including information like when and by whom the
text was created and changed); and (2) author-created data like “track changes” and “insert
comment”). In light of this common usage of the term, references to “metadata” in law review
articles, ethics opinions, and case law should be read broadly to encompass all forms of embedded
electronic information.
13

Sinha, supra note 12, at 179-80 (explaining that, outside of litigation, on a daily basis attorneys
exchange electronic documents potentially containing metadata); see also infra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text (discussing inadvertent disclosure of confidential metadata in transactions).

14

The legal basis for an order that a document cannot be used and must be returned to the disclosing
attorney is that the privilege has not been waived by the disclosure. See infra note 58 and
accompanying text.

15

Those states are: California, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia. The absence of a professional conduct rule addressing inadvertent disclosure is
not necessarily dispositive of the state’s view on the issue. For example, Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) appears to address unauthorized but not inadvertent disclosure, though it
could be interpreted so broadly as to encompass inadvertent disclosure. See MD. LAWYER’S RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011). Nonetheless, Maryland adopted an ethics opinion that is broadly
protective of inadvertently disclosed documents. See Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 0004 (2000). California imposes obligations on the recipient of inadvertently disclosed information
through case law. See, e.g., Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1099 (Cal. 2007)
(explaining that a receiving lawyer should not review documents beyond what is necessary to
determine that it is privileged or confidential and then must inform the sending attorney).
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adopted Model Rule 4.4(b), 16 which only requires the recipient of an inadvertent
disclosure to notify the sender.17
Comments to Rule 4.4(b) state that whether the receiving lawyer must return
the document or take other steps is a legal matter,18 and they proceed to explain that
the notice provision of the rule permits the sending lawyer to “take protective
measures.”19 Undoubtedly, the “protective measures” contemplated to address the
“legal issue” of the document’s disposition is filing a motion with the court. 20
Without pending litigation, however, there is no simple means for transactional
lawyers to stop an opponent from misusing inadvertently disclosed information.
16

ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2010); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4–4.4(b) (2011); IDAHO RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); IND. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:4.4(b) (2011); KAN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011);
MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4–4.4(b)
(2011); MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3–
504.4(b) (2011); NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 16-404B. (2011); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); N.C. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5(a) (2011); OHIO RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); OR.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); R.I.
RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); S.D.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); VT.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011);
WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS 20:4.4(b) (2011); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW R. 4.4(b) (2011).
17

The full text of Model Rule 4.4(b) provides, “A lawyer who receives a document relating to the
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2010).

18

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010) (“Whether the [receiving] lawyer is
required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond
the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been
waived.”).

19

Id. (“[T]his Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to
take protective measures.”).
20

See infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing how litigators take protective measures by filing
a motion or responding to a motion seeking a ruling on privilege waiver).
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Even if the transactional lawyer has a solid legal argument that the information
should be returned, 21 the lawyer’s only recourse would be to file suit. Research
reveals no case in which a transactional lawyer filed litigation for the purpose of
reclaiming disclosed information or seeking the disqualification of a transactional
lawyer who misused inadvertently disclosed information.22
Without easy access to the courts for a legal ruling, the professional conduct
rules are the only protection for transactional lawyers and their clients dealing with
inadvertent disclosure. Rather than erring on the side of protecting confidentiality
absent a legal ruling from a court, the rules allow one lawyer to take advantage of
another lawyer’s mistake. In the vast majority of states, the receiving lawyer’s only
obligation is to notify the sending lawyer of the mistaken disclosure.23 With that
notice, the sending lawyer can request the document’s return.24 But the receiving
lawyer can refuse without recourse – and go on to use the information to the
disclosing lawyer’s disadvantage, in a negotiation, for example. This problem is
especially troubling given what we know about the increasing frequency of
inadvertent disclosure in the technology age25 and the effort that lawmakers (but not
professional conduct rule makers) have made to address the problem of inadvertent
disclosure in litigation.26

21 The “solid legal argument” that the document should be returned would be based on the factors
courts use to determine whether inadvertent disclosure results in privilege waiver. See infra note 64.
22

There is a case in which a transactional lawyer inadvertently disclosed confidential information and
the legal right to use the information became an issue in the subsequently filed litigation by the
receiving lawyer. The litigation was not filed for the purpose of resolving the legal issue of the right
to use the inadvertent disclosure; it was filed because the disclosure seemed to reveal conduct for
which the opposing client would have liability to the receiving lawyer’s client. Jasmine Networks, Inc.
v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 125-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev. granted, 94 P.3d
475 (Cal. 2004), and rev. dismissed, 182 P.3d 513 (Cal. 2008). While this case demonstrates that it is
possible for transactional lawyers to seek a ruling on the proper disposition of an inadvertently
disclosed document, the case also exemplifies the difficulty of seeking that ruling when litigation is not
pending at the time of the disclosure.
23

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.

24

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010).

25

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

26 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (discussing 2006 amendment) (explaining
clawback agreement’s use as a means to minimize the risk of privilege waiver.); FED. R. EVID. 502
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While it is often noted that one cannot “unring the bell” of an inadvertent
disclosure,27 this observation can be misleading. It is true that the lawyer who read
the inadvertent disclosure cannot unlearn that information; however, professional
conduct rules and other sources of law can prohibit receiving lawyers from doing
additional damage.28 For example, professional conduct rules could prohibit reading
more information than necessary to determine that the document was confidential
and not intended for the receiving lawyer. The rules could further prohibit the
document being circulated to other people – such as other lawyers and client
representatives. Further, rules could prohibit taking notes about and otherwise using
the confidential information that was inadvertently disclosed. In other words,
though the bell cannot be unrung, the professional conduct rules could prohibit the
receiving lawyer from ringing the bell again and again and again. 29
A minority of jurisdictions takes this approach. 30 Through a variety of
provisions, these jurisdictions require the receiving attorney to return or otherwise
advisory committee notes (rule seeks to provide parties with a “predictable, uniform set of standards”
to determine the consequences of inadvertent disclosure). See also infra Part III.
27

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

28

Edna Selan Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
470 (American Bar Association, 5th ed. 2007) (“Clearly the bell of inadvertent disclosure cannot be
unrung. . . . Nonetheless, certain steps can be taken to minimize the damage. Will courts allow the
privileged matter to remain in the hands of the adversary and will they allow the privileged matter to
be revealed to a lay fact-finder?”).
29

See, e.g., Holland v. Gordy Co., Nos. 231183–85, 2003 WL 1985800, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr.
29, 2003) (even though lawyer and co-counsel debated whether certain documents were disclosed
inadvertently, lawyer took notes about the substance of the documents, had them copied, and
provided copies to co-counsel without informing the producing lawyer of the possible mistake); State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (receiving attorney
provided inadvertently disclosed information to expert who then provided it to another adverse
attorney).

30

ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2011); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b), (c) (2011) (only applies if document has not
already been read by receiving lawyer at the time sender notifies the receiving lawyer that the
document was inadvertently sent); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011) (protections
apply if document has not been examined by receiving lawyer); KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.130(4.4)(b) (2011); LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); ME. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); N.J. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011).
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protect the content of an inadvertently disclosed document.31 One example of this
approach is Maine’s rule requiring that a lawyer who reasonably believes a document
was inadvertently disclosed: “(1) shall not read the writing or, if he or she has begun
to do so, shall stop reading the writing; (2) shall notify the sender of the receipt of
the writing; and (3) shall promptly return, destroy or sequester the specified
information and any copies.”32 The rule further provides that “[t]he recipient may
not use or disclose the information in the writing until the claim is resolved, formally
or informally,” and either attorney may “present the writing to a tribunal under seal
for a determination of the claim.”33 This minority approach provides a measure of
protection for transactional lawyers practicing in such jurisdictions. Further, as
discussed in Part IV of this article, these rules may also provide a template for
transactional lawyers practicing in other jurisdictions and interested in fashioning
their own contractual solutions to inadvertent disclosure.34
Another complicated inadvertent disclosure issue faced by transactional
lawyers relates to embedded electronic data, or “metadata.” 35 When client and
lawyer jointly edit and communicate with one another in a draft document (such as
by using comments and track changes), that document will contain confidential
31

See supra note 30.

32

ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011).

33

Id. A similar rule, imposing detailed duties on a recipient of an inadvertent disclosure, is
Tennessee’s Rule 4.4(b), which provides that
(b) A lawyer who receives information . . .that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is protected by RPC 1.6 (including information protected by the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product rule) and has been disclosed . . .
inadvertently . . . shall:
(1) immediately terminate review or use of the information;
(2) notify the person . . . of the inadvertent . . . disclosure; and
(3) abide by that person’s . . . instructions with respect to disposition of written
information or refrain from using the written information until obtaining a
definitive ruling on the proper disposition from a court with appropriate
jurisdiction.

TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011).
34

See infra Part IV.

35

See supra note 12 and accompanying text (defining metadata).

116

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

embedded information (such as who deleted a provision and comments explaining
why).36 If the attorney does not remove that embedded data, an opposing attorney
who receives the document may be able to learn confidential information by turning
on “track changes” again, by viewing the document’s properties, or by taking other
steps to view the data.37 Professor David Hricik recounts the true story of a lawyer
who used metadata in a contract negotiation to reveal “all of the internal comments
that the sending lawyer had received from [the client] concerning the terms of the
contract, negotiating positions, and bottom-lines.”38
Attorneys must be vigilant in preventing such disclosures39 and mindful that
opposing counsel may be looking at this embedded data – particularly in jurisdictions
where an ethics opinion has explicitly stated that it is not an ethical violation to

36

See, e.g., Bennett & Cloud, supra note 3, at 474 (describing examples of transactional lawyers’
confidential information in metadata, such as lawyer and client comments on a draft proposal or
deletions of standard contract terms); Hricik, supra note 12, at 82 (considering how embedded data
may reveal confidential communications between transactional lawyers and their clients); Andrew M.
Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 767, 773–74 (2005) (describing confidential information that may be contained in a
draft contract’s metadata).
37

Elizabeth W. King, The Ethics of Mining for Metadata Outside of Formal Discovery, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
801, 806 (2009) (explaining that the sending attorney and client may use track changes as they draft a
contract and turn off track changes before sending the document to opposing counsel; then opposing
counsel may find the confidential metadata by “turning the track changes function on again or using
some other technological means to reveal the metadata”); see also Hricik, supra note 12, at 83-84
(describing how metadata can be revealed by looking at a document’s “Properties,” such as author,
creation dates, and time spent editing the document); Sinha, supra note 12, at 177-78 (explaining that
metadata can be revealed by using track changes, employing “technologically advanced methods not
readily available to a lay person,” and innocently finding a hidden comment after placing a cursor over
the text where the comment had been inserted).
38

Hricik, supra note 12, at 82.

39 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16, 17 (2010). The American Bar Association
maintains a chart of state ethics opinions on metadata, including which states explicitly discuss an
attorney’s obligation to prevent the disclosure of confidences in metadata. See Joshua Poje, Metadata
Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_fyis/metadatachart.html
(last
updated July 20, 2011) [hereinafter Metadata Ethics Opinions]; see also infra note 43 and accompanying
text (discussing examples of ethics opinions addressing a sending attorney’s obligation to remove
confidential metadata).
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review an opponent’s metadata. 40 Upon finding client confidences, a receiving
attorney must determine whether the disclosure was “inadvertent.”41 If so, then the
regular professional conduct obligations apply – meaning “notice only” in most
jurisdictions. 42 This, of course, leads the sending attorney back to the problems
discussed earlier.
Metadata solutions that make sense for litigators do not necessarily work for
transactional lawyers. Many ethics authorities encourage attorneys to prevent
inadvertent disclosure of metadata by using scrubbing programs or simply
transmitting documents by PDF, fax, or in paper form.43 Yet, lawyers negotiating a
contract may want to edit a single document and use metadata for things like

40

See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008) (allowing a receiving attorney to
review metadata, but requiring the receiving attorney to presume that any confidential information
was inadvertently sent); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 341 (2007) (permitting the review of
metadata unless the recipient has “actual knowledge” that the metadata was inadvertently sent); Pa.
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2009-100 (2009) (allowing
review and use of an opponent’s metadata, but noting that, if the receiving lawyer determines the
disclosure was inadvertent, notice is required under the professional conduct rule). The American Bar
Association maintains a chart describing state metadata ethics opinions, including whether metadata
“mining” is permitted or prohibited. See Metadata Ethics Opinions, supra note 39.
41

See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text; see also ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 4
(2011) (stating that confidential information found in metadata may have been inadvertently disclosed,
which would trigger obligations under Rule 4.4(b)). Some state ethics opinions explicitly address the
obligation to notify a sending attorney if confidential information was inadvertently disclosed in
metadata. See Metadata Ethics Opinions, supra note 39.
42
43

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008) (suggesting that attorneys scrub
metadata, print documents in circumstances where it is vital that no metadata be transmitted, and
avoid redline or hidden comments); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 2008–2009/4 (2009)
(asserting that lawyers do not have to purchase software to scrub metadata from documents, but may
instead take steps to avoid creating metadata, delete metadata, or send a hard copy, faxed, or scanned
version of a document); W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 2009-01 (2009) (explaining
methods to protect confidences in metadata, including sending hard copies, sending only images
through scanning or creating Portable Document Format (“PDF”) files, faxing, and using software
programs to scrub metadata).
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tracking changes and inserting comments to one another.44 Exchanging PDF files,
facsimiles, or documents scrubbed of metadata may hinder their work. A related
problem is that some states have issued ethics opinions prohibiting lawyers from
mining the metadata of an opponent’s document. 45 Thus, transactional lawyers
practicing in these jurisdictions may run afoul of these authorities by viewing
embedded data in an electronic document, even for an innocent purpose unrelated
to uncovering an opponent’s confidences.46 Transactional lawyers, whether sending
or receiving a document, should be able to use metadata consistent with their clients’
legitimate interests. In the absence of authorities that address these issues,
transactional lawyers and their clients should address these issues on a case-by-case
basis.
Finally, transactional lawyers need to be aware that inadvertent disclosure can
have an impact on future litigation. At some point in the future, a transactional
lawyer’s client might be a party to a lawsuit. This lawsuit could be filed by a party to
the current transaction or by an uninvolved third party. An inadvertent disclosure of
confidential information while putting together a deal could be the basis for a waiver
argument during litigation. 47 That waiver argument will be easier to make if the
disclosing attorney did not act reasonably to prevent the disclosure and did not act

44

Hricik, supra note 12, at 83-87 (describing metadata features in Microsoft Word and how they are
useful to lawyers and their staff); King, supra note 37, at 807 (explaining that transactional lawyers
intentionally share metadata in contract negotiations because it allows lawyers to easily view and
accept or reject changes).

45

See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Office of Gen. Counsel, Ethics Op. RO-2007-02 (2007) (opining that the
unauthorized deliberate search for metadata by a receiving attorney is prohibited); Ariz. State Bar
Ethics Comm., Op. 07-03 (2007) (prohibiting unauthorized search of metadata); Fla. Bar Ethics
Dep’t, Op. 06-2 (2006) (prohibiting recipient of an electronic document from reviewing document’s
metadata); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 196 (2008) (opining
that a lawyer “may not ethically take steps to uncover metadata . . . sent by counsel for another party”
in search of confidential information); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 2008–2009/4 (2009)
(prohibiting lawyers from searching for, reviewing, or using metadata, reasoning that such information
is inadvertently sent).
46

See Perlman, supra note 9, at 791 (arguing that ethics opinions that ban metadata mining “incorrectly
assume that metadata mining is intended to uncover protected information”).

47

See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes (discussing Subdivision (d)) (explaining the risk
that a prior inadvertent disclosure will result in waiver in subsequent litigation if clawback agreement
is not enforceable in future litigation).
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promptly to rectify it.48 Transactional lawyers should be mindful of these issues and
take steps to protect against waiver arguments in future litigation.49 These issues are
discussed more extensively in Part IV. First, Part III considers the protections
available for litigators facing inadvertent disclosure and provides an explanation for
why transactional lawyers should care about this body of law.
III.

SOLUTIONS FOR LITIGATORS: THE LAW AND TOOLS THAT PROTECT
LITIGATORS AND THEIR CLIENTS FROM THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF
INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE

In litigation, lawyers and their clients are better protected against the adverse
consequences of inadvertent disclosure.50 In the following discussion, I explain the
law beyond professional conduct rules that apply in litigation. To the extent that the
law itself does not provide protection, it provides tools that allow litigators to protect
themselves. The purpose of this discussion is twofold. First, it demonstrates the
disparity in the consequences of inadvertent disclosure for litigators and nonlitigators. Second, the law discussed may be important for transactional attorneys if
they are able to co-opt it and apply it in a transactional setting.
When an inadvertent disclosure happens in litigation in federal court51 (and in
a growing number of state courts),52 the rules of civil procedure protect the content
of the disclosed document pending a ruling by the court. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) states that, if a receiving lawyer is notified of a claim of work
product or privilege, the lawyer “must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies it has,” is prohibited from “disclos[ing] the
information until the claim is resolved,” and “must take reasonable steps to retrieve
the information if the party disclosed it before being notified.”53 The rule further
provides that the receiving lawyer “may promptly present the information to the
48

See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (explaining the factors that have a bearing on waiver in
balancing jurisdictions and under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b)).
49

See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (describing clawback provisions that may be relevant
to a subsequent waiver determination).
50

See infra notes 53, 57, 73 and accompanying text.

51

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

52

See, e.g., TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(5).

53

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
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court under seal for a determination of the claim” and that the producing lawyer
“must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.”54 Significantly, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) does not apply to disclosures that occur outside
discovery.55 This means that the rule applies to a document inadvertently produced
in response to a request for production of documents, but not to an e-mail
inadvertently sent to opposing counsel.
Regardless of whether an inadvertent disclosure occurs inside or outside
discovery, 56 having a pending case means that counsel can file a motion seeking a
ruling on whether privilege was waived by the disclosure.57 A ruling on “privilege
waiver” has broader implications than the document’s admissibility at trial. A finding
of no waiver is the legal basis for the court granting various forms of relief, including
that the document must be returned to the sending attorney or destroyed,58 that the
document’s contents must not be used or referenced further by the receiving

54

Id.

55

See id.

56

Just like transactional lawyers, litigators often disclose confidential information outside of discovery
– such as the misdirected e-mail that was meant for the client but was instead sent to opposing
counsel. But unlike their transactional counterparts, litigators are able to file a motion seeking the
document’s return and other relief from the court. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am.
Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217, 218 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (defense counsel sent privileged letter intended for his
client to opposing counsel); Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 638 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)
(determining whether privilege was waived for documents that were to be delivered to court for an in
camera review but that were mistakenly delivered to opposing counsel); Robertson v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., 143 F.R.D. 194, 195–96 (S.D. Ill. 1992) (counsel mistakenly attached privileged documents to a
letter sent to opposing counsel).

57

See supra note 56 and infra notes 58-60; see also Fischer, supra note 10, at 241 (arguing that a
professional conduct obligation to return an inadvertently disclosed document is “unlikely to generate
much modern debate” because a court will ultimately determine whether privilege is waived, and,
once that decision is made, the obligation to return the document will be clarified).
58

See, e.g., Kumar v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 08-2689, 2009 WL 1683479, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. June 16,
2009) (granting Hilton’s “Emergency Motion for Return of Privileged Documents and Non-Waiver of
Privilege”); Resolution Trust, 868 F. Supp. at 218, 221 (requiring plaintiff’s counsel to destroy a
confidential letter that was accidentally mailed to plaintiff’s counsel); In re Kent Cnty. Adequate Pub.
Facilities Ordinances Litig., No. 2921–VCN, 2008 WL 1851790, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2008)
(ruling during discovery phase of case that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver and that
privileged documents must be returned to disclosing party).
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attorney, 59 and that a receiving lawyer who has already made use of disclosed
information should be disqualified from the case.60
Whether a party waives privilege because of an inadvertent disclosure is
usually determined on a case-by-case basis.61 Though there are other approaches,62
historically, most courts have followed a “balancing” approach. 63 Whether an
inadvertent disclosure results in waiver depends on the court’s determination of five
factors: reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; the
scope of discovery; the extent of the inadvertent production; the promptness of

59

See, e.g., Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676, 698 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (finding that
inadvertent disclosure did not waive privilege, the court ordered receiving counsel to destroy the
copies of the documents, not to use any of the documents for any purpose, to destroy notes
concerning the documents , and to certify compliance within seven days); Figueras v. P.R. Elec.
Power Auth., 250 F.R.D. 94, 95 (D.P.R. 2008) (describing case in which disclosing party sought
protective order directing receiving party to “return the inadvertently disclosed document” and
prohibiting receiving party from “inquiring into matters discussed in the document”); Transp. Equip.
Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187, 1188–89 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding
privilege was not waived and ordering the receiving party to not use the document, to provide a copy
of the order to all recipients of the document, and to file with the court a description of efforts made
to ensure no improper use of the document).
60 See, e.g., Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1205 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (describing factors to be
considered in determining disqualification for a lawyer who receives unauthorized disclosure of
privileged documents); Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1100-01 (Cal. 2007)
(affirming disqualification of receiving lawyer who read and used inadvertently disclosed information);
Atlas Air, Inc. v. Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 997 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per
curiam) (disqualifying firm when attorney reviewed privileged documents that were inadvertently
delivered to the firm by opposing counsel’s copy vendor); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly
Lady Décor, Inc., 724 So. 2d 572, 573-74 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that tactical advantage
resulting from receipt of inadvertently disclosed privileged documents is grounds for disqualification
even without a showing of prejudice when receiving attorney does not comply with ethics opinion
requiring notice and prompt return of inadvertently disclosed documents).
61

See, e.g., Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Group Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (S.D. Tex. 1993).

62

The lenient approach provides that waiver never results from inadvertent disclosure without
evidence of client intent. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). In contrast, the strict approach directs that inadvertent disclosure always results in waiver. In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). While these black-and-white approaches may not
always seem fair, the lenient and strict rules provide for a result that is certain.

63

See Figueras, 250 F.R.D. at 96-97 (discussing the differences between the tests and opting for the
“middle test”).
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measures taken to remedy the disclosure; and fairness to the parties.64 Since the
rule’s enactment in 2008, federal courts have determined privilege waiver by applying
the test contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).65 The rule provides that a
disclosure of privileged information does not result in waiver if: (1) the disclosure
was inadvertent; (2) the holder took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3)
the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including following
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).66 The 502(b) test has been described as
flexible enough to encompass the balancing approach.67 Accordingly, many federal
courts continue to refer to the five-factor balancing test in their 502(b) analyses.68
The balancing test and 502(b) standard for waiver are thought to be fairer than a rule
that inadvertent disclosure always or never results in privilege waiver, 69 but with
fairness comes uncertainty and inconsistent outcomes from case to case.70

64

See, e.g., Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).

65

See FED. R. EVID. 502(b).

66

Id.

67

FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes (discussing Subdivision (b)) (explaining that 502(b)
does not explicitly incorporate the five-factor balancing test, but describing 502(b) as “flexible enough
to accommodate” any of the five factors from the balancing test).
68

See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 4949959, at
*10 (D. Colo. 2009); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
69

See, e.g., Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. at 637 (describing the balancing test as the fair approach to privilege
waiver); FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes (discussing Subdivision (b)) (describing the
committee’s choice to fashion a rule that “opts for the middle ground” in accordance with the
majority view on inadvertent disclosure and waiver).
70

See Corey v. Norman, Hanson & Detroy, 742 A.2d 933, 942 (Me. 1999) (describing the balancing
approach as creating “an uncertain, unpredictable privilege, dependent on the proof of too many
factors concerning the adequacy of the steps taken to prevent disclosure”); Memorandum and Order
at 11, Cocard Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Comvest Grp. Holdings, LLC, No. 08-2677-III (Tenn. Ch. Ct. April
7, 2010) (reviewing Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) and federal cases considering the appropriateness
of waiver for inadvertent disclosure, and determining “[t]o the Court’s disappointment, it was unable
to determine a guiding principle from its review of . . . numerous cases. . . . [T]his Court concluded
that the federal decisions appear to be ad hoc and turn on . . . a fact or several facts.”); see also Elizabeth
King, Waving Goodbye to Waiver? Not So Fast: Inadvertent Disclosure, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, and
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 467, 511 (2010) (arguing that despite Congressional
intent, Rule 502(b) is susceptible to individual judges’ interpretations, resulting in waiver and an
unpredictable privilege).
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Given this uncertainty about the prospect of privilege waiver and its
increasing prevalence, many litigators began entering into “clawback agreements.”71
The purpose of these agreements was to ensure that an inadvertent disclosure could
be “clawed back” without waiver.72 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence both acknowledge the use of clawback agreements73 and
their purpose of avoiding privilege waiver.74 Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence
502(d) provides that, if a court orders that privilege is not waived by disclosure in
that case, the disclosure is not a waiver in any subsequent federal or state case.75

71

See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing the use of
clawback agreements); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“[M]any parties to document-intensive litigation enter into so-called ‘claw-back’ agreements that
allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to return inadvertently
produced privileged documents.”).
72

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 28, at 433 (describing a clawback agreement as one in which the parties
agree that an inadvertent production of privileged documents will not result in waiver and that this
contractual agreement will trump existing waiver case law).

73

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (discussing 2006 amendment) (describing clawback
and quick peek agreements); FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes (discussing Subdivision (d))
(discussing the use of “claw-back and quick peek arrangements”). In a quick peek agreement, parties
agree to turn documents over to an opponent without any privilege review, and the opponent agrees
that doing so does not waive privilege. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (discussing
2006 amendment).

74

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (discussing 2006 amendment) (explaining that
clawback agreements “minimize the risk of [privilege] waiver.”); FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory
committee notes (describing the rule as seeking to provide a “predictable, uniform set of standards”
under which litigants can know the consequences of an inadvertent disclosure, such as under the
terms of a “confidentiality order” (a term used in the comment to describe a clawback or quick peek
agreement incorporated into a court order)).

75

This provision was intended to address the concern that if parties had a clawback agreement and
disclosed a document in “case one,” the disclosure could be considered a waiver in “case two”
involving a new party who had not agreed to the clawback agreement. The thinking was that if the
court ordered no waiver in case one and Rule 502(d) made that order binding in case two, then the
parties could have greater security that they would be protected from waiver. See FED. R. EVID. 502,
advisory committee notes (discussing Subdivision (d)) (describing concerns that, absent adoption of
the Rule, a confidentiality order in one case may not be enforceable in other proceedings). The
problem is that having a clawback agreement (even one incorporated into a court order) does not
necessarily prevent waiver in case one, much less case two. See supra notes 73-74 and infra notes 76-77
and accompanying text (discussing how waiver can result despite a clawback agreement or order); see
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Clawback agreements (including clawback agreements incorporated into
court orders) 76 have been an imperfect solution to the uncertainties of privilege
waiver following an inadvertent disclosure. Parties have frequently included terms in
clawback agreements that are subject to debate, leading the parties back to court to
seek a judge’s ruling on the issue. For example, clawback agreements may require
that the disclosure was “inadvertent,” that the disclosing party took “reasonable
precautions” to prevent disclosure, or that the disclosing party acted “promptly” to
seek the return of the document.77 While these provisions seem reasonable enough,
they introduce the uncertainty that clawback agreements were intended to avoid.78
The result is often a waiver fight no different than what the parties would have
encountered under Rule 502(b) (or equivalent state law) in the absence of a clawback
agreement. 79 Ultimately, if the court finds that parties did not satisfy the
also Schaefer, supra note 6, at 220-24 (discussing the risks of waiver even with a clawback order in a
federal court).
76

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence contemplate clawback agreements being
incorporated into court orders. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv); FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
77

See, e.g., Lefta Assocs. v. Hurley, No. 1:09-CV-2487, 2011 WL 2456616, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (The
parties agreed that the “inadvertent” disclosure of privileged documents shall not waive privilege if the
producing party took “reasonable care” to prevent the disclosure and “promptly requests” their
return.); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 09-6335 (WJM), 2011 WL 1792791, at
*12 (D.N.J. 2011) (The court stated that, although it had allowed documents to be clawed back under
the parties’ clawback agreement, the court could revisit the issue of whether privilege was waived by
inadvertent disclosure based on the balancing test.); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271
F.R.D. 125, 128-29 (S.D. W.Va. 2010) (The parties’ lengthy and complex clawback agreement
specifically provided that the reasonableness standard of 502(b)(3) would not apply even if challenged
by receiving attorney but did not foreclose a challenge based on 502(b)(1) or (2).); Kandel v. Brother
Int'l Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079-80 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (The clawback order stated that
inadvertent disclosure does not result in waiver but further provided that the order does not alter the
“legal definition of ‘inadvertent,’ to reduce or diminish the standard or showing required to establish
that production . . . was truly inadvertent . . . .”); Callan v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 564,
565–66 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (The parties agreed that the “inadvertent production of any discovery
material by any party shall be without prejudice to any subsequent claim by the producing party that
such discovery material is privileged . . . and shall not be deemed a waiver of any such privilege or
protection.”).

78
79

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Mt. Hawley, 271 F.R.D. at 133-36 (consistent with parties’ agreed clawback, court did not
consider compliance with 502(b)(3) but considered whether disclosure should result in waiver based
on Rule 502(b)(1) and (2)); Kandel, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (analyzing the facts and citing inadvertent
disclosure law – including Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) – to determine whether the defendants’
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requirements of the clawback, the court may rule that the disclosure resulted in
privilege waiver.80 And even if the court ultimately determines that the privilege was
not waived, the parties have expended valuable resources fighting about the
consequences of inadvertent disclosure that a better-crafted clawback could have
resolved without court intervention.81 If transactional lawyers solve their inadvertent
disclosure problems with clawback agreements, they should learn from the mistakes
lawyers have made with the agreements in litigation. This issue and others are
discussed in the next Part.
IV.

OBTAINING INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE PROTECTION THE BAR FAILED
TO PROVIDE TRANSACTIONAL ATTORNEYS

In this Part, I now turn to what transactional lawyers can do to mitigate the
harm of an inadvertent disclosure before or after it occurs. In the absence of
professional conduct rule protection, transactional attorneys have two options. First,
they can react to an inadvertent disclosure after it happens. A sending lawyer’s
skillful response to the mistake can mitigate the damage. In Subpart A, I discuss the
tools at the sending lawyer’s disposal, as well as the limits of this approach.
The transactional lawyer’s second option is contractual and occurs before the
disclosure. Opposing attorneys can enter into a clawback agreement in which they
agree on the consequences of an inadvertent disclosure. In discussing this option in
Subpart B, I consider the issues that may weigh in favor of a contractual approach
and the provisions that attorneys can use to address these issues. I also discuss how
production was “inadvertent” under the terms of the clawback); Callan, 263 F.R.D. at 565-66 (in
analyzing whether the disclosure was “inadvertent” under the clawback order, the court applied the
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) standard).
80

See, e.g., Callan, 263 F.R.D. at 566 (determining that privilege was waived under clawback order
because disclosing party did not carry its burden of proof that the disclosure was “inadvertent”); Mt.
Hawley, 271 F.R.D. at 133-36 (determining that inadvertent disclosure waived privilege under clawback
agreement because disclosing party did not take reasonable precautions to prevent waiver under Rule
502(b)(2)). Judge Paul W. Grimm discussed the Mt. Hawley case in a recent article and lamented that
Rule 502 will not “reach its intended goal of reducing the cost of ESI discovery” if courts “demand
near-perfection in preproduction precautions.” Grimm, supra note 7, at *50. I agree and add that Rule
502 can only reach its potential if parties do not draft clawback agreements that open the door for
litigants and courts to make post-disclosure determinations of “inadvertence,” “reasonableness,” and
similar issues.
81

See, e.g., Kandel, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
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transactional lawyers can avoid the drafting mistakes commonly made by litigators,
and I consider the risks that non-litigators cannot fully address with a clawback
agreement.
A. Reactive Solutions: Skillfully Responding to a Mistake to Mitigate the Damage of an
Inadvertent Disclosure
Even though the contractual solution discussed in Subpart B may be
preferable because it is a proactive approach, many transactional attorneys will not
pursue that option. Despite the possibility of inadvertent disclosure, some lawyers
may believe, “It won’t happen to me.” Other lawyers may recognize the risk but fear
that the request for a clawback will cause them to appear paranoid or worse. Maybe
opposing counsel will think the clawback is a “set up” for some strategic conduct in
the negotiation. For these reasons, and despite the threat of inadvertent disclosure
discussed in Part II of this article, many transactional lawyers will do their best to
prevent inadvertent disclosure82 and resign themselves to deal with it if and when it
occurs.83
Against this backdrop, this subpart discusses what a transactional attorney
can do to mitigate the harm of a disclosure after it occurs. The first hurdle is
discovering an inadvertent disclosure. 84 Some lawyers will discover their own
mistake immediately. Others will not know until the receiving lawyer alerts the
sender of the disclosure. In most jurisdictions, professional conduct rules require a
receiving attorney to provide notice if he or she determines that the disclosure was

82

A growing number of resources provide a wealth of practical information about the measures that
lawyers can take to protect confidential client information. For example, the ABA’s Legal Technology
Resource Center provides information about encryption, unsecured wi-fi, cloud computing, metadata,
and other topics. See Legal Technology Resource Center, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources.html.
83 These issues weigh in favor of a professional conduct solution to inadvertent disclosure. If lawyers
know their clients face a risk but do not have an easy means to deal with that risk contractually, this is
an appropriate place for the bar to step in with a solution. For a discussion of additional factors that
weigh in favor of a professional conduct solution to inadvertent disclosure, see generally Schaefer, supra
note 6, at 232-47.
84

Id. at 225.

2011]

TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE

127

“inadvertent.”85 The sending lawyer can only hope the receiving lawyer interprets
the term “inadvertent” broadly, leading to notice.86
With knowledge of the mistake, the sending attorney must act immediately to
protect the content of the disclosed information. Acting quickly is important, not
only because it supports a legal argument of no waiver,87 but also because it may
prevent further dissemination and use of the information by the receiving lawyer.
Sending counsel’s efforts should focus on educating the receiving attorney of
professional conduct authority and legal authority that support returning and making
no use of the information.88
First, I consider professional conduct authority that may be of assistance.
While this Article has already discussed the gaps in professional conduct rules,89 there
are rules that, if applicable, will help the sending attorney.90 Choice of law principles
may be especially important in this regard. The choice of law rule, based on Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5 in many states, allows transactional lawyers
engaged in multi-jurisdictional practice to make a reasonable choice of which
jurisdiction’s professional conduct rule should apply to their conduct. 91 The rule
could be the law of the jurisdiction where the conduct occurs or the jurisdiction
where its predominant effect will occur.92
Where is the predominant effect of an inadvertent disclosure? It arguably
could be in the jurisdiction of the sending attorney’s location, the receiving attorney’s
85

See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text (discussing inadvertent disclosure professional
conduct rules).
86

See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of “inadvertent.”).

87

FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (one factor considered in determining waiver is whether the sending attorney
promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the disclosure).
88

See supra note 30 (listing many rules that support requiring a receiving attorney to return and make
no use of inadvertently disclosed confidential information).

89

See supra Part II.

90

See supra note 30.

91

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2010). The rule includes a safe harbor, providing
that a lawyer “shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct
will occur. Id.
92

Id.
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location, or either client’s location. As long as the choice of law issue is resolved in a
reasonable manner, the receiving attorney will not be subject to discipline under Rule
8.5.93 This flexibility can present an opportunity for the sending attorney to make an
argument about which jurisdiction’s professional conduct authority should apply.
Obviously, if it is an available option, the sending attorney will advocate for a
jurisdiction with a professional conduct rule, ethics opinion, or case law that imposes
an ethical obligation to return and cease use of the document.94
Even in the absence of professional conduct authority that provides for the
document’s return, the sending lawyer may still have hope. Professional conduct
rules in most states give the receiving lawyer permission to return the document even
if there is no legal or ethical obligation to do so.95 Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4
provides that even without a legal requirement, “the decision to voluntarily return
such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the
lawyer.”96 A sending lawyer, especially one with a good relationship with opposing
counsel, could cite this authority in a request for the document’s return.
Beyond citing professional conduct rules, the sending attorney should also
try to persuade the receiving attorney that there is strong legal authority for the
document’s return. As previously discussed, the receiving lawyer’s rights in the
document largely turn on the issue of privilege waiver.97 If the privilege was not
waived by disclosure, the law generally provides that the document should be
returned and not used or disseminated.98 If the document has already been used,
there may be authority for the proposition that the receiving lawyer should be
disqualified. 99 To make this argument, the sending lawyer must research the
inadvertent disclosure waiver law of the applicable jurisdiction. As previously
discussed, federal courts and most state courts follow some version of a balancing
test under which various factors are considered to determine the appropriateness of
93

Id.

94

See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text (citing professional conduct rules that provide for
protection beyond that provided in Model Rule 4.4(b)).
95

See supra note 16 and accompanying text (majority of jurisdictions follow Model Rule 4.4(b)).

96

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2010).

97

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

98

See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.

99

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

2011]

TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE

129

waiver.100 Even though lawyers cannot know definitively how a court would rule on
the issue, a sending lawyer can articulate the best case for a finding of no waiver
under these factors.101
If a receiving lawyer refuses to return (or refuses to cease use and
dissemination of) a client’s inadvertently disclosed information, a declaratory
judgment action could prevent further harm to the client. 102 The sending lawyer
would ask the court to declare that the privilege was not waived and to require the
document’s return, without further use or dissemination, in addition to other relief.103
When a disclosure may result in significant harm to the client if the information is
not re-captured, transactional lawyers should consider the benefits of this option.
Waiver law is flexible enough that a convincing argument against waiver is always
possible.104 Furthermore, if a federal court had jurisdiction over the matter, a federal
court order stating that the privilege was not waived by the disclosure would be
enforceable in subsequent federal and state courts.105 So, if a party fears that a third
party may use the information in subsequent litigation, a federal court order
determining that privilege was not waived by the disclosure would prevent that
use.106

100

See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.

101

See supra note 63-68 and accompanying text.

102

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-29 (West 2011) (“The superior court in any action or
proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 527.010 (West 2010) (“The circuit
courts of this state, within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”).
103

See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing relief available in litigation for inadvertent
disclosure).

104

See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (describing factors considered to determine waiver).

105

FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (federal courts can order that privilege is not waived by disclosure and such
order is binding in all other federal and state proceedings).

106

See id.
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B. Proactive Solutions: Contracting for Protection Prior to an Inadvertent Disclosure
Rather than merely reacting to an inadvertent disclosure when it happens,
transactional lawyers can take the proactive approach of negotiating a clawback
agreement. 107 A clawback agreement would be appropriate in any non-litigation
matter, because there is always a risk of inadvertent disclosure.108 Also, special issues
arising in a transaction may encourage the contractual approach. For example, if
attorneys anticipate exchanging and editing multiple drafts of a contract, they may
want to enter into a clawback agreement that addresses the issue of metadata.109 If
the needs of a transaction dictate a large exchange of documents (particularly for a
client who frequently consults with counsel), the heightened risk of inadvertent
disclosure may encourage parties to consider a clawback.110 There are two different
times when an inadvertent disclosure could be used against the client: in the subject
transaction or in the future, such as in subsequent litigation.111 Both issues can be
addressed – at least to an extent – in a clawback agreement. Of course, all clients
face a risk of a lawsuit, but the risk is more pronounced for clients that are frequently
involved in litigation. This may be another factor that weighs in favor of a negotiated
clawback agreement.
After considering the applicability of the foregoing issues to a given client’s
situation, an attorney should draft a clawback agreement with two audiences in mind:
the parties involved in the subject transaction and the universe of possible parties
that could be involved in litigation with a party to the clawback. The parties to the
current transaction will not have easy access to a court to resolve issues of
interpretation, so it is essential that the clawback agreement provide simple, clear
107

This approach may gain momentum as state professional conduct rules follow the trend of civil
procedure and evidence rules that include comments encouraging parties to enter clawback
agreements. See, e.g,. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (encouraging lawyers to resolve
inadvertent disclosure before it happens by entering into “agreements containing explicit provisions as
to how the parties will deal with inadvertently sent documents”).
108

See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing risks of inadvertent disclosure for nonlitigators).
109

See supra notes 36 and accompanying text.

110

King, supra note 70, at 468 (explaining that the chances of inadvertent disclosure are higher when
parties exchange more documents).
111

See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (extending non-waiver of privilege to a recipient’s use in subsequent
litigation).
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instructions for how the parties will address an inadvertent disclosure. 112 Even
though the terms of a clawback agreement can only bind the parties to the
agreement,113 there are clawback terms that may be helpful in resolving future waiver
disputes with non-parties to the agreement. 114 A well-developed clawback can
address both audiences.
The simplest clawback agreement could be one that incorporates the terms
of another jurisdiction’s inadvertent disclosure professional conduct rule. For
example, Tennessee’s Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) provides broad protection
when a document is inadvertently disclosed. 115 Attorneys not practicing in
Tennessee might agree to adopt this approach (or another state’s approach) as their
clawback agreement. They could simply agree in a letter (or an exchange of e-mail
messages) that they are concerned about inadvertent disclosure116 and that they agree
to comply with the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) (or
their chosen rule) in addressing any inadvertent disclosure.
One advantage of this pick-another-jurisdiction’s-rule approach is that it is
not time consuming. If the lawyers choose wisely, their inadvertent disclosures will
be governed by a better rule than the rule that would otherwise apply. One
disadvantage is that most professional conduct rules include the undefined word
“inadvertent,” and competing interpretations of the term can be a contentious issue
if a disclosure occurs. 117 Accordingly, if transactional attorneys select a rule that
contains the term “inadvertent,” they should broadly define the term in their
112

See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.

113

See FED. R. EVID. 502, advisory committee notes (discussing Subsection (d)) (explaining that
Subsection (d) was adopted so that a court order regarding privilege waiver would be binding on third
parties who otherwise would not be bound by parties’ clawback agreement). Without access to a
court, transactional lawyers cannot seek an order that will make their clawback binding on third
parties. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (allowing federal court to order that privilege is not waived by
disclosure in the litigation pending before it and that such an order is binding in subsequent federal
and state proceedings).
114

See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.

115

See supra note 33 for text of Tennessee’s Rule 4.4(b).

116

They could also describe the steps they will take to prevent inadvertent disclosure. See infra notes
119-20 and accompanying text.
117

See supra notes 7, 77-81 and accompanying text (describing problems that arise when clawback
agreements include the term “inadvertent”).
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agreement to mean any unintentional disclosure of confidential information.118 Of
course, this phrase is also subject to interpretation, but it is preferable to leaving the
term undefined. The approach of choosing another jurisdiction’s rule also does not
address specific issues that may be causes for concern, such as handling metadata,
large exchanges of documents, or subsequent litigation. Lawyers dealing with such
issues may benefit from spending time drafting their own clawback agreement.
For an individualized clawback agreement, attorneys should ideally address
four issues in the document. First, the clawback agreement should begin with
recitals of the inadvertent disclosure risks perceived by the parties and their plan for
addressing those risks to prevent inadvertent disclosure. The section should
conclude with a statement that the following clawback agreement is entered to
provide an additional measure of protection if a disclosure occurs.119 It is critical that
the parties not make proof of compliance with these recitals a prerequisite to relief
under the clawback agreement – doing so will introduce ambiguity that is emblematic
of poorly-crafted litigation clawback agreements.120 The goal here is a simple, selfexecuting agreement that provides a remedy without proof of anything.
So, if proving compliance with the recitals is not a prerequisite for relief,
what is the goal? There are two different, and important, purposes of the recitals
section of a clawback. First, including this provision encourages the parties to
engage in planning that may prevent inadvertent disclosure.121 For example, if a large
volume of documents is being provided to one party, the producing party might state
the approximate number of documents to be provided and articulate a reasonable
plan to locate and withhold privileged documents prior to providing them to the
opponent. If parties plan to exchange electronic documents (such as draft

118

See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining how some jurisdictions broadly define
“inadvertent”).

119 Because the client must consent to the disclosure of confidential information and the clawback
agreement concerns the possible disclosure of confidential information, it is advisable to seek the
client’s informed consent to the agreement. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010)
(client must provide informed consent to the disclosure of confidential information unless the
disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation or as otherwise provided in
paragraph (b)).
120

See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.

121

See infra text accompanying notes 123-24.
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contracts), they should address metadata.122 Their agreement should state whether
counsel and client can (or cannot) view an opponent’s metadata123 and explain how
counsel will avoid transmitting confidential information in metadata. 124 This
planning (embodied in the recitals section) may help avoid not only inadvertent
disclosure, but also violation of professional conduct authorities – by a sending
attorney who might otherwise violate the confidentiality rule125 and by a receiving
attorney who might otherwise be prohibited from mining metadata.126
The other purpose behind these recitals is that they may have a bearing on a
waiver determination in subsequent litigation with a third party who is not otherwise
bound by the agreement.127 Statements in the clawback regarding the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in the transaction or the volume of
documents to be exchanged in the transaction are facts that could influence a later
court’s waiver analysis.128 Thus, the recitals should be drafted with waiver in mind.
The second issue the clawback must address is what event will trigger an
obligation by the receiving attorney. The receiving attorney’s determination that a

122

See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.

123

Recall that there may be a practical purpose for both attorneys wanting to view opponent
metadata, such as using track changes to efficiently edit the document. See supra notes 12 and
accompanying text.
124

For information about how to avoid creating and how to remove confidential metadata, see Hricik,
supra note 12, at 92-96 (also discussing entering into an agreement with opposing counsel regarding
the consequences of disclosing confidential embedded data). Further, in a jurisdiction that has opined
that it is unethical to view an opponent’s metadata, the attorneys can state explicitly that they agree
that doing so is appropriate in this transaction. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing
ethics opinions prohibiting metadata review).
125

This is consistent with an attorney’s duty of confidentiality.
accompanying text.

See supra notes 5, 39 and

126

Professor Hans Sinha advocates attorneys entering agreements regarding how they will use
metadata to avoid problems created by conflicting ethics authorities prohibiting and permitting
metadata mining. Sinha, supra note 12, at 256-57.
127

A waiver determination for a party to the agreement will be addressed by a later provision of the
agreement.

128

FED. R. EVID. 502(b). See also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing issues
considered in waiver analysis).
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disclosure is “inadvertent” usually triggers professional conduct rule obligations 129
and clawback agreement obligations.130 The problem is that some receiving attorneys
will interpret the phrase narrowly – just as some courts interpret it – and do nothing
to address the receipt of an opponent’s confidential information. 131 If pushed on the
issue by a sending attorney who recognizes the mistake, the receiving attorney may
argue that the disclosure was not “inadvertent.”132
Ironically, perhaps, one answer is to not include the term “inadvertent” as a
trigger. The clawback agreement could provide that the receiving attorney must take
certain defined steps when either: (1) the sending attorney alerts the receiving
attorney that information was unintentionally disclosed; or (2) the receiving attorney
receives an opponent’s information that appears to be attorney-client privileged,
work product protected, or otherwise confidential under Rule 1.6.133 The first part
of the trigger allows the sending attorney to set the clawback in motion simply by
notifying the receiving party (without proof of “inadvertence”), similar to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).134 The second part attempts a broad trigger for
the clawback’s protections: if the receiving attorney recognizes information as
privileged, work product protected, or confidential, the clawback is triggered. 135
While the confidential 136 (or privileged or work product protected) 137 status of a
129

Schaefer, supra note 6, at 206-07 (noting that of the forty-one jurisdictions with professional
conduct rules addressing the issue in 2010, thirty-nine required a receiving attorney to determine if the
disclosure was “inadvertent”).
130

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

131

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

132

See, e.g., supra note 80 (discussing cases where receiving lawyers argued that opponent’s disclosure
did not fit the definition of “inadvertent,” so courts had to analyze the issue to determine waiver).
133

This language regarding a document’s status as privileged, work product protected, or confidential
under Rule 1.6 is similar to the language included in Tennessee’s professional conduct rule, though
that rule also includes the term inadvertent. See TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011).

134

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

135

Another alternative would be to provide that the agreement is triggered by the receiving attorney’s
receipt of an inadvertent disclosure. The agreement could then define inadvertent to mean any
disclosure that appears to be unintentional or a mistake. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
136

“Confidential” is so broadly defined under Model Rule 1.6 (and equivalent rules in most states)
that virtually any document received from an attorney is one that “relates to the representation of the
client” and is thus conceivably confidential absent the client’s actual or implied consent that it be
disclosed. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). So, including the reference to
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document is not always clear, this language is so broad that many documents that the
sending attorney would like to protect should be encompassed within it.
Third, the agreement should address the parties’ obligations if the clawback is
triggered. Here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) provides a great
template for comprehensive protection,138 though some of its provisions should be
modified to address the fact that there is no pending litigation.139 If key provisions
of the procedure rule were incorporated into a clawback agreement, the clawback
might provide that either trigger event would obligate the receiving attorney to
promptly return or destroy the information and any copies, to not use or disclose the
information, and to take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if it has already
been disseminated. 140 While Rule 26(b)(5)(B) allows the receiving attorney to
sequester the information and promptly present it under seal to a court for a waiver
determination,141 these provisions are likely not appropriate or useful when litigation
is not pending.

“confidential” broadens the category of documents received that should trigger the receiving
attorney’s obligation, which may result in better protection for disclosed documents.
137

Transactional attorneys and their clients could address this problem by making a greater effort to
designate notes, letters, correspondence and other documents “attorney-client privileged” anytime
there is a confidential communication between attorney and client for the purpose of seeking or
giving legal advice or “work product protected” when a document is prepared in anticipation of
litigation.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2011)
(characterizing the attorney client privilege); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (describing work product
protection). The approach of designating documents “privileged” does not work if attorneys and
clients over-designate documents (marking everything privileged even when it is not), so the
designations must be used thoughtfully and accurately. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 466 (noting that
a receiving attorney’s ability to recognize “privileged” documents may hinge on correct designations
by sending counsel). See generally Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client
Privilege, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2010) (discussing why the attorney-client privilege must be
broadly defined given the broad range of matters on which lawyers provide counseling in the modern
practice of law); Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1869 (2011) (considering the breadth of the work product protection for the work for corporate
attorneys).
138

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

139

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

140

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

141

See id.

136

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

Finally, the clawback agreement should provide a standard for determining
waiver if a party ever asks a court to rule that an inadvertent disclosure in the
transaction resulted in privilege or work product waiver.142 The provision that would
be most protective is one that unambiguously states that any disclosure of attorneyclient privileged or work product protected information between parties will not
result in waiver.143 The section could further provide that this provision does not
prohibit a party from arguing that disclosed information does not otherwise qualify
as privileged or work product protected.144
If for some reason a lawyer does not abide by the clawback agreement, the
agreement has teeth. A sending party could sue for breach of contract if the
receiving party does not comply with the agreement’s terms.145 In this litigation, the
lawyer can seek the same forms of relief that litigators seek when they ask a court to
rule on privilege waiver.146 A non-compliant attorney could also be the subject of a
bar complaint for violating a state-equivalent of Model Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4, which defines professional misconduct as including “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”147 More important than the ability to sue, though, the clawback
has the benefit of ensuring that both parties understand and agree to the
consequences of inadvertent disclosure. As a result of the discussion in a low-stress
setting (before an inadvertent disclosure), both lawyers are more likely to understand
and comply with their obligations when, and if, the issue arises.
142

This is the situation that occurred in Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Marvell Semiconductor. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
143

This waiver standard does not contain the problematic terminology that is commonly the subject
of debate with other clawback agreements. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.

144

Such a provision should have been sufficient to protect the receiving party’s rights in Jasmine
Networks, Inc. v. Marvell Semiconductor, where the receiving party argued that the disclosed information
was not privileged. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. If the parties add such a provision, that
provision should further provide that if a party contemplates making a waiver argument in litigation,
the party still must comply with the terms of the clawback agreement but may direct the sending party
to preserve the disclosed information so that such a ruling can be sought.
145

Of course, this is not the usual way that such disputes are brought to a court's attention. When
litigation is already pending, the parties would not file a breach of contract case but would seek the
court's ruling on the issue of waiver (or no waiver) based on the parties' actions and the terms of the
clawback.
146

See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.

147

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2010).
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CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that transactional attorneys and their clients have been
largely ignored by inadvertent disclosure professional conduct rules. The lack of
protection in professional conduct rules does not mean that inadvertent disclosure is
not a problem for transactional lawyers and their clients. Inadvertent disclosure is
common today, and clients of transactional lawyers face a real risk that a recipient of
an inadvertent disclosure will keep it, use it, and perhaps provide access to someone
who will use it in future litigation.
In the future, professional conduct rules should be amended to provide
inadvertent disclosure protection to both litigators and transactional attorneys.
Revised rules should protect the confidentiality of a disclosed document to the
extent possible unless and until a court finds that privilege was waived by the
disclosure. This approach recognizes the inescapable frequency of inadvertent
disclosure in modern practice and the wisdom of erring on the side of protecting
clients and their confidences.
But until such rule revisions are undertaken, transactional lawyers must work
with the law as they find it and create their own solutions to inadvertent disclosure.
Some will take a reactive approach: they will not agree in advance to the
consequences of inadvertent disclosure, but they will endeavor to understand the
web of ethical and legal authorities that may provide protection if a mistake happens.
When a disclosure occurs, these attorneys will act promptly to articulate a persuasive
and sound argument for the document’s return and for counsel's agreement that no
further use will be made of the document's contents. Other transactional lawyers
will take a proactive approach and contract for the protection the bar has failed to
provide. If they learn from the mistakes of litigator clawback agreements and
address the issues that are of importance to their clients, transactional lawyers can
better protect their clients from the adverse consequences of inadvertent disclosure.

